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The solutions to most local environmentalproblems are no longer in the hands of thestate and municipal offici s elected by he
people most directly concerned. Instead man-
dates issue forth from Washington in tax-code-
like abstractions, their terms dictated by the
complex interplay between Congress, the White
House, the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), the federal judiciary, and various special
interest groups, including the self-described pub-
lic interest groups. Just who is responsible for
which aspect of any given policy remains a mys-
tery to the local citizenry. Even if they did know,
it would be hard to pin responsibility on officials
who are accountable at the polls. And, even if the
responsible officials did have to face reelection,
any local concerns would count for little in the
welter of issues in national elections. So, as a
practical matter, a federal aristocracy imposes
environmental controls on localities, regardless
of local wishes.
The nationalization of environmental policy is
both radical and recent. Washington sets manda-
tory environmental quality goals, specifies stan-
dards for categories of pollution sources, and
dictates deadlines and procedures for states and
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cities by which to implement them. Yet the regu-
lation of pollution was almost entirely the
province of state and local governments before
the early 1970s.
The early 1970s were a time of panic, not just
about the environment, but also about Vietnam,
urban riots, and the ability of government at any
level to respond to the needs of human beings.
The desperate times produced martial measures.
The response to Vietnam was war, the response
to poverty was called a "war," and the response
to environmental degradation was sufficiently
warlike that national politicians could boast that
they had won the fight before it began. A federal
chain of command was established in which
Congress gave instructions to the EPA about how
it should give instructions to the states about
how they should deal with all environmental
problems. The statutory and regulatory instruc-
tions take into account every conceivable contin-
gency and also order the states to submit to the
EPA voluminous plans and reports to ensure that
the primary instructions are carried out. There
was little thought that the eco-war would be run
from state capitals rather than Washington; after
all, the federal government itself had caused
many of the most controversial problems of the
day (e.g., nuclear power plants, big dams, stream
channelization, federal highways, overgrazing of
federal lands). Similar problems came from
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nationally marketed goods, which states could
not regulate without subjecting manufacturers to
a maze of requirements (e.g., new cars, lead in
gasoline, DDT). But the federal government did
not stop with correcting its sins of commission
and omission-it decided to declare war on all
aspects of the environmental problem, no matter
how local.
After a flurry of federal statutes, environmen-
tal quality improved and the panic ebbed. From
this, many people, such as Greg Easterbrook in
his 1995 book A Moment on the Earth: The
Coming Age of Environmental Optimism, con-
cluded that the national takeover was necessary
to clean up the environment.
Rationales for Federal Mandates
One rationale given for why Washington should
take over was that pollution can cross state bound-
aries. "Everything is connected to everything else,"
went the mantra. States will not set reasonable
standards for interstate pollution because, in regu-
lating local polluters, state officials have little polit-
ical incentive to take account of the harm that pol-
lution causes out of state. However, the first and
largest single step in the national environmental
takeover, the Clean Air Act amendments of 1970,
failed to deal with interstate pollution. The heart of
the Clean Air Act is the federally required state-
implementation plans whose function is to achieve
the mandatory national ambient air-quality goals.
The statute requires the EPA to disapprove a state's
implementation plan if it would fail to achieve the
national goals instate or allow pollution to signifi-
cantly interfere with a downwind state's ability to
achieve those goals. The EPA has repeatedly
enforced the instate requirement but, over the last
quarter century, has not enforced the interstate
requirement, despite complaints from downwind
states. As an environmental law textbook con-
cludes, "The control of interstate pollution pro-
vides an easy rationale for federal regulation of air
pollution .... Despite this ... the control of inter-
state pollution would still have to be considered an
unfulfilled promise."
Other federal environmental statutes also focus
on intrastate pollution. Under the Resource
Recovery and Conservation Act and the Superfund
statute, the federal government sets comprehen-
sive standards for the disposal of toxic wastes and
the cleanup of contaminated sites, primarily to
protect subterranean water and soil, which usual-
ly do not cross state lines. Similarly, the Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act aims primar-
ily at restoring landscape contours, a quintessen-
tial local issue, and only secondarily at controlling
the runoff of mining wastes into streams and
rivers, which can contribute to interstate pollu-
tion. Likewise, the Safe Drinking Water Act deals
with the local distribution of water. Thus, the
national takeover of environmental law must be
defended, if it can be defended at all, on the basis
that Washington should regulate local pollution.
The sponsors of the Clean Air Act amendments
of 1970 also argued that Washington must take
over because the states had failed to protect the
environment. But, it was the federal government,
not the states, that had been the laggard. With the
emergence of the environmental movement in the
1960s, state and local governments responded to
public sentiment by enacting broader pollution-
control laws. According to Robert W. Crandall's
study, published by the Brookings Institution,
"Controlling Industrial Pollution: The Economics
and Politics of Clean Air," leading pollutants were
reduced three times as much in the 1960s as in the
1970s. Yet, the federal government's first substan-
tive steps toward regulating air pollution thwarted
aggressive state regulations.
In the early 1960s, the automobile manufacturers,
concerned that many states might impose strict and
differing emission limits on new cars, sought
advice from Lloyd Cutler, an eminent Washington
lawyer, former New Dealer, and later counsel to
President Carter. Cutler suggested that the manu-
facturers get Congress to give the secretary of
Health, Education, and Welfare (this was before
the creation of the EPA in 1970) the authority to
regulate emission standards for new cars. He rea-
soned that the companies would be able to keep
the secretary from imposing expensive pollution-
reduction measures and that this national authori-
ty would be a powerful argument against state reg-
ulation. Congress obliged the auto manufacturers
in 1965, and in 1967 it actually prohibited most
states from regulating new-car emissions. The
1967 statute was also designed to help electric util-
ities by requiring states to regulate their emissions
through a complicated process that was likely to
delay and weaken any controls applied to them.
In comparison, the federal government neglect-
ed the air-pollution issues with which it was par-
ticularly well-suited to deal. It did little to control
emissions from new cars, as Cutler predicted, and
totally failed to remove the lead from gasoline. In
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1970 the political winds shifted in Washington.
Earthday and a series of acute air episodes on the
East and West Coasts made air pollution a hot-
button, national issue. In addition, Ralph Nader
published his study "Vanishing Air" in which he
accused Senator Edmund Muskie of selling out to
polluters. Muskie had hoped to ride his environ-
mental record to the presidency in 1972. A bid-
ding war commenced in which President Nixon,
Senator Muskie, and other legislators seeking the
1972 presidential nomination vied to be the envi-
ronmental champion by proposing the toughest
air-pollution laws in history.
The resulting statute, a 1970 amendment to
the Clean Air Act, regulated new cars with vigor
and also, as the first step in the national
takeover, required the states to regulate station-
ary sources to achieve national air-pollution
goals. As the Supreme Court put it, "Congress
took a stick to the states." The EPA later claimed
that this federal stick radically reduced pollution
from stationary sources. But according to
Crandall, "Assertions of the tremendous strides
[the] EPA has made are mostly religious senti-
ment." The belief that it took the federal govern-
ment to make the states act comes from federal
officials who claim credit for what state officials
had already been accomplishing.
EPA officials call the national takeover "a
dynamic state and federal partnership," suggest-
ing that in Washington "dynamic" means "heads I
win, tails you lose." Given the palpable unfairness
of this condescending partnership, elected state
officials often resist federal environmental man-
dates. In the ensuing drama, state officials are cast
as the environmental bad guys, rounded up by the
EPA cavalry and, if need be, hauled before a feder-
al judge. That such typecasting is a function of the
structure of the federal statutes, rather than some
peculiar environmental insensitivity of state gov-
ernments, is made clear by one federal environ-
mental statute in which federal officials bear
responsibility for most cleanup costs-Superfund.
Then the shoe is on the other foot; state officials
perennially call for cleanups that cost more than
federal officials are willing to pay. In sum, the
record does not show that federal officials are
more environmentally sensitive, just that they
have the power to act more opportunistically.
EPA's Chain of Command
Even though the federal takeover was unneces-
sary, is there anything to be gained by returning
authority over pollution to state and local gov-
ernments? Yes, indeed. For starters, we could
dispense with the entire federal chain of com-
mand-its bulk defies belief.
At its pinnacle is a thick volume of statutes in
fine print. Under this volume is a stack more than
two-feet high, also in fine print, of EPA regula-
tions. The EPA regulations are so lengthy, in part,
because those who write them respond more to
pressures from the agency to enlarge and protect
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its power than to the public's need for clear, con-
cise rules. The problem is not that the agency is
oversolicitous of environmental quality; it is that it
is oversolicitous of itself. So, the regulations con-
strue the agency's power overbroadly and then
react to the obvious instances of overbreadth by
providing narrowly defined exclusions and vari-
ances. Thus, under a statute regulating the han-
dling of hazardous wastes, the agency takes seven-
teen pages to define the concept of "hazardous
waste"-the definition reads as if written by
Monty Python's John Cleese.
This is still just the tip of the pyramid, for the
agency copiously supplements its regulations
with "guidance" documents. (You can see why
guidance is necessary.) For example, one subset
of the guidance documents for Superfund cases
fills thirteen loose-leaf notebooks. There are
probably twice as many guidance documents for
that particular statute, but no one knows for sure
because the agency itself has been unable to
assemble a complete collection. The various
mandated state plans and returned state reports
provide still lower levels of the pyramid, each
exponentially larger than the one before. The
entire pyramid would be unnecessary in a system
not run from Washington; so would many of the
EPA's 17,000 employees and the state, municipal,
and private-sector employees who participate in
the federal rule-making proceedings and perform
the paperwork required by the federal rules.
States and localities, if left to their own
devices, would not adopt such a compulsive style
for making environmental policy. Instead of try-
ing to reason from cosmic first principles to com-
prehensive solutions, local officials could assess
particular problems as they arise and decide what
should be done, just as sensible human beings
handle issues that arise in their lives.
Professors Henry N. Butler of the University of
Kansas and Jonathan R. Macey of Cornell
University speak for many liberal and conserva-
tive scholars in concluding that the "command
and control regulatory strategy. . . has not set
intelligent priorities, has squandered resources
devoted to environmental quality, has discour-
aged environmentally superior technologies, and
has imposed unnecessary penalties on innova-
tion and investment." And no wonder. People sit-
ting in Washington are trying to choreograph all
of the environmentally related activities in the
United States in the face of wide disparities in
local conditions and ceaseless changes in pollu-
tion-control technology. Moreover, EPA officials
must respond to elected officials, and the federal
courts have jurisdiction over EPA regulations. As
Professor Richard Stewart of the New York
University School of Law put it, the federal chain
of command is a "self-contradictory attempt at
central planning through litigation."
The Framers of the Constitution envisioned
states serving as laboratories in which different
policies would be tried and compared. State-by-
state experiment, however, disappears with fed-
eral mandates. Yet experiment is what we need.
Scholars from diverse political perspectives have
suggested pollution taxes, emissions trading,
greater reliance on the common law, and other
radical alternatives to Washington's command-
and-control approach. Others, such as former
EPA administrator William Ruckelshaus, have
criticized the federal approach under which
there are separate regulatory schemes for air pol-
lution, water pollution, and so on. They suggest,
instead, that plans be looked at holistically
because this approach often can produce better
overall environmental quality at lower costs,
implying flexibility at the local level. Such inno-
vation, however, threatens the EPA with its worst
nightmare-loss of control. So, while the EPA
feels compelled to experiment, it hedges innova-
tive programs with so much red tape that flexi-
bility is largely illusory. States, on the other
hand, are more open to real experimentation;
and it makes more sense to experiment on the
state level.
Accountability
With the national takeover, democratic account-
ability goes by the boards for three reasons. First,
the massive job of controlling the nation's envi-
ronment from Washington encourages Congress
to delegate its policy-making responsibilities to
the EPA. As a result, environmental policies are
made by bureaucrats rather than officials who
are directly accountable to voters. Second, voters
cannot effectively hold national officials account-
able for how they resolved local environmental
disputes. Third, federal mandates give federal
legislators and the president the means to take
credit for the benefits of environmental pro-
grams while placing blame for any ensuing costs
on state and local officials.
Popular revulsion at such federal opportunism
resulted in the passage of the Unfunded Mandates
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Reform Act of 1995. The act is an attempt to keep
Congress from imposing mandates on state and
local governments without providing the neces-
sary funds to implement them. In other words, if
Washington politicians take credit for the benefits
promised by a new mandate, they must also take
responsibility for ensuing costs. But, as is well
known, the act leaves in place all preexisting
mandates, including the entire corpus of federal
environmental law.
The national environmental laws are chiefly reg-
ulatory mandates and sometimes tax mandates.
For instance, Title V of the Clean Air Act amend-
ments of 1990, which require air-polluters to
secure permits from states, turns out to be a man-
date to tax. Under Title V, states must charge per-
mit fees at a level that the EPA deems sufficient to
fund the bulk of the state's air-pollution control
program, not just the cost of issuing the permit as
the EPA suggests. Prior to 1990, most polluters did
not have to get permits, yet they still had to comply
with emission limitations. Before the statute, state
pollution officials had to get approval for their
budgets from state legislators who also had to take
responsibility for the taxes needed to fund the bud-
gets. After the statute, unelected federal officials
supplanted much of the budgetary and taxing
authority of elected state officials. The State and
Territorial Air Pollution Program Administrators
Association and the Association of Local Air
Pollution Control Officials, whose funding comes
partly from the EPA, vigorously supported the fed-
eral mandate for permits and support federal man-
dates in general.
The Rise of the National Class
The national takeover of environmental policy is
not an isolated event. Professor Robert H. Wiebe,
a historian at Northwestern University, in his
book Self-rule: A Cultural History of American
Democracy, argues that the single most striking
change this century in American government was
the rise to power of a nationally oriented, elitist,
antidemocratic group that he calls the "national
class." As he tells the story, the heyday of democ-
racy in America (for white men anyway) was the
nineteenth century, when power resided in a
large middle class oriented around the "Main
Streets" of America. The Main Street middle class
believed in democracy. Voter self-education was
prevalent, and voter turnout was much higher
than in the twentieth century.
Around 1890 the new national class began to
emerge-it was urban, educated, and believed
that its expertise and highly rationalized means
of analyzing problems were engines of progress.
While the Main Street class was to be found at
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the village school board, the Rotary Club, or
behind the counter at the local bank, the national
class gathered in the higher counsels of govern-
ment, nationally oriented groups like the
American Bar Association, and nationally orient-
ed corporations. Thinking that experts like them-
selves should not have to be accountable to "lay
people," the national class restructured elections
and governmental processes to insulate policy-
makers from electoral accountability. A prime
example was delegating law-making power to
administrative agencies, often thought of as a pet
project of the New Dealers. Professor Wiebe
shows, however, that the haughty mind set of the
national class was entrenched at the national
level with the election of Herbert Hoover, who
ran for office as the "Great Engineer." Its meth-
ods of trying to insulate decisions from the voters
also included federal mandates and the turning
of questions of policy into questions of "rights,"
including environmental rights.
Professor Wiebe's description of the national
class is not the same as how the national class
defines itself, for such aristocratic pretensions
are hardly compatible with its self-image of rea-
soned tolerance. So each one of its institutional
innovations for blunting popular control of poli-
cy issues comes with a set of less-aristocratic-
sounding rationales. In the case of the national
takeover of environmental policy, the rationale
was that states would not make good decisions
on intrastate pollution because, in competing to
lure employers, each state would set ever lower
environmental standards, so all states would end
up with the poorest possible environmental stan-
dards-a "race-to-the-bottom" argument.
It is true that a state is likely to set lower envi-
ronmental standards than it otherwise might in
order to attract industry from other states. But
sellers of goods set prices lower than they other-
wise might to attract customers. The question is,
why isn't such competition between states, as
with sellers, a good thing? In the early days of
the New Deal, many policymakers believed that
competition among sellers was inherently disas-
trous because sellers would engage in a race-to-
the-bottom price that would lead most of them to
bankruptcy. This thinking resulted in the New
Dealers' attempts to control all prices. Soon,
however, economists showed that price competi-
tion does not lead to a race to the bottom, except
in rare circumstances. The proponents of a
national takeover of environmental regulation
never thought much about what conditions
would be necessary to produce a race to the bot-
tom among states regulating pollution. They
knew that there was a race to the bottom because
they wanted more stringent regulations, and they
knew themselves to be reasonable.
Professor Richard Revesz of the New York
University School of Law concluded that "race-
to-the-bottom arguments in the environmental
area have been made for the last two decades
with essentially no theoretical foundation."
Revesz has not proven that there never could be
a race to the bottom, but he has shown that it
was not the real reason for the national takeover.
The clincher is that the national government has
taken control of many environmental issues for
which a race to the bottom is impossible because
the facility in question is not portable-for exam-
ple, abandoned waste sites.
The race-to-the-bottom argument does not jus-
tify the continued national control of intrastate
pollution. The argument focuses upon just one
determinant of state environmental policy-the
competition to attract employers-ignoring other
determinants such as the competition to avoid
pollution, which goes by the name NIMBY-that
is, "not in my back yard." NIMBY is a race to the
top. The national class deplores both race to the
bottom and NIMBY. In one thing it is constant:
people like themselves should shoulder the
experts' burden of supplanting the decisions of
the communities affected. Moreover, the logic of
the race-to-the-bottom argument suggests that all
aspects of state and local government that would
tend to affect industrial location should be taken
over by a government with broader jurisdiction
and, in an increasingly global economy, that gov-
ernment should be international in scope. This is
an argument for the nascent "international
class." Even if enough scholars could torture eco-
nomic models long enough to produce some set
of assumptions under which there would be a
tendency towards a race to the bottom, it is
implausible that its impact would be sufficient to
offset the benefits of getting rid of the federal
chain of command.
In rejecting the race-to-the-bottom argument, I
own that some states will end up at the bottom
relative to others. This is anathema to environ-
mentalists who are fervent enough to think that
any pollution is too much and naive enough to
think that environmental standards divide purity
from danger. In fact, between purity and danger is
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a huge gray area entailing risks smaller than those
we face crossing the street. Where to set standards
in that gray area is a question of policy, not rights.
One of the virtues of allowing states to set their
own environmental policies would be that elec-
torates with different environmental values could
set their own standards for intrastate pollution;
those who dislike the balance struck in their state
could move to another one.
It is also possible that some states will fail to
deal with pollution hot-spots that present real
dangers; however, the national class exaggerates
this potential because it looks down on ordinary
voters. If pollution is starkly dangerous in a
locale, it will be the stuff of reports by associa-
tions of state regulators, the news media, med-
ical associations, and the EPA. Informed voters
know what to do. Indeed, federal laws requiring
firms to make public their emissions of toxic pol-
lution have caused firms to reduce emissions on
their own and have led states such as Louisiana,
often thought of as a polluter's haven, to tighten
regulations. And if worse comes to worst, people
can move or sue. Although there are many obsta-
cles to redress under common law, there are sig-
nificantly less when a threat is defined and immi-
nent. Finally, the federal chain of command has
failed to respond to egregious threats for years
on end; you can look it up in the congressional
testimony of environmental groups.
A Proposal to Reform the EPA
The Environmental Protection Agency should be
stripped of its power with four exceptions. First,
it should gather and publicize information on
pollution and its consequences, both on the
national and the local level. Second, it should
propose to Congress rules of conduct to control
types of interstate pollution that are not ade-
quately addressed by the states or that require
special protection, such as the Grand Canyon.
Third, it should propose to Congress rules of
conduct for goods, such as new cars, when state-
by-state regulation would erect significant barri-
ers to interstate commerce. Fourth, it should
draft model state environmental laws and con-
duct policy studies that states could use when
considering whether to enact such laws. States,
however, should be free to amend or reject feder-
al proposals in favor of different approaches to
pollution control.
I first suggested such a radical reduction in the
national role for pollution control at a conference
attended in large part by EPA officials, and for-
mer-EPA officials, whose law practices are built
upon their knowledge of the agency's inner-work-
ings. Threatened with rustication from the nation-
al class to mere Main Street status, they reacted as
if I had released a mouse to run around the room.
For all their yelping, they came up with only three
arguments to keep their privileges, each of which
reveals much of what is wrong with the federal
environmental aristocracy.
First, they argued that many state pollution
control agencies are short staffed. Of course their
concept of the "work that needs to be done" is
based on the paper-pyramid model of the federal
chain of command-they actually think it is use-
ful. Much of federal environmental officials' time
is spent telling state and local officials what to do
and checking that they do it. Under my proposal,
we could dispense with a large portion of the
EPA's 17,000 staffers. Perhaps some of them
could be sent to the states; but, that may not be
necessary once the paper pyramid has been com-
posted. Even now, state and local governments
mount the vast majority of enforcement actions.
The EPA loyalists further argued that it takes
the national government to stand up to locally
powerful industries. Sometimes, of course, the
neighbors of a plant are reluctant to see it regulat-
ed to the point of purity for fear that it will go
bankrupt or move. As loyal members of "the best
and the brightest," the federal environmental aris-
tocracy wants the power to "bomb the village to
save it." On the other hand, a plant might get its
way because it has greased some palms. As
Professor Arthur Schlesinger Jr. observed in argu-
ing against devolution of authority to the states,
local government is controlled by the "locally pow-
erful." The premise of his argument is that the
national government is controlled by the virtuous
rather than the powerful. Concentrated interests
buy "access" in Washington just as they buy
"clout" on Main Street. The difference is lost on
me. While the state and local political playing
fields are not perfectly level, at least people know
the score. It would be hard to find an Arkansan
who does not know that the Tyson poultry folks
have clout in Little Rock. But at the federal level,
the workings of concentrated interests are shroud-
ed by the remoteness, size, and complication of
the federal government.
Finally, the EPA loyalists argued that state
governments are not competent to produce
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sound regulations. But, being the folks who took
part in writing the EPA's contributions to the
Federal Register, they were throwing stones from
a glass house. The language that the EPA pro-
duces is-and I mean this-worse than the bab-
ble that comes from the Internal Revenue
Service. It is opaque, arcane, elliptical, repetitive,
and evasive. The policies are often dumb and
sometimes perverse. EPA staffers explain that
such problems derive in part from the legislative
and administrative constraints under which they
operate. True enough, but the federal house is
still glass, regardless of who built it. In the down-
sized EPA that I propose, the EPA, stripped of its
fiat power, could retain its leadership role only
by convincing states to adopt its regulations by
the quality and sensibility of its policies. That is
how the private organization that proposes the
Uniform Commercial Code and other uniform
laws to the states attains its influence. We need
an EPA that succeeds by earning its leadership,
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